Does von Neumann Entropy Correspond to Thermodynamic Entropy?

Conventional wisdom holds that the von Neumann entropy corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, but Hemmo and Shenker (2006) have recently argued against this view by attacking von Neumann's (1955) argument. I argue that Hemmo and Shenker's arguments fail due to several misunderstandings: about statistical-mechanical and thermodynamic domains of applicability, about the nature of mixed states, and about the role of approximations in physics. As a result, their arguments fail in all cases: in the single-particle case, the finite particles case, and the infinite particles case

Does von Neumann Entropy Correspond to Thermodynamic Entropy?

Conventional wisdom holds that the von Neumann entropy corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, but Hemmo and Shenker (2006) have recently argued against this view by attacking von Neumann (1955) and his argument. I argue that Hemmo and Shenker's arguments fail due to several misunderstandings: about statistical-mechanical and thermodynamic domains of applicability, about the nature of mixed states, and about the role of approximations in physics. As a result, their arguments fail in all cases: in the single-particle case, the finite particles case, and the infinite particles case

Does Von Neumann's Entropy Correspond to Thermodynamic Entropy?

Conventional wisdom holds that the von Neumann entropy corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, but Hemmo and Shenker (2006) have recently argued against this view by attacking von Neumann's (1955) argument. I argue that Hemmo and Shenker's arguments fail due to several misunderstandings: about statistical mechanical and thermodynamic domains of applicability, about the nature of mixed states, and about the role of approximations in physics. As a result, their arguments fail in all cases: in the single-particle case, the finite particles case, and the infinite particles case

T Falls Apart: On the Status of Classical Temperature in Relativity

Taking the formal analogies between black holes and classical thermodynamics seriously seems to first require that classical thermodynamics applies to relativistic regimes. Yet, by scrutinizing how classical temperature is extended into special relativity, I argue that it falls apart. I examine four consilient procedures for establishing classical temperature - the Carnot process, the thermometer, kinetic theory, and black-body radiation. I show how their relativistic counterparts demonstrate no such consilience in defining relativistic temperature. Hence, classical temperature does not appear to survive a relativistic extension. I suggest two interpretations for this situation - eliminativism akin to simultaneity, or pluralism akin to rotation.Comment: Presented at the Philosophy of Science Association 2022 meeting. Forthcoming at Philosophy of Scienc

Effective fair pricing of international mutual funds

We propose a new methodology to provide fair prices of international mutual funds by adjusting prices at the individual security level using a comprehensive and economically relevant information set. Stepwise regressions are used to endogenously determine the stock-specific optimal set of factors. Using 16 synthetic funds whose characteristics are extracted from 16 corresponding actual US-based Japanese mutual funds, we demonstrate that our method estimates fund prices significantly more accurately than existing methods. Although existing fair-pricing methods provide an improvement over the current practice of simply using Japanese market closing prices, they are still highly vulnerable to exploitation by market-timers. By contrast, our method is the most successful in preventing such strategic exploitation since no competing method can profit from our stated prices. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.preprin

No Time for Time from No-Time

Programs in quantum gravity often claim that time emerges from fundamentally timeless physics. In the semiclassical time program time arises only after approximations are taken. Here we ask what justifies taking these approximations and show that time seems to sneak in when answering this question. This raises the worry that the approach is either unjustified or circular in deriving time from no-time.Comment: Presented at Philosophy of Science Association 2021 meetin

Decoherence, Branching, and the Born Rule in a Mixed-State Everettian Multiverse

In Everettian quantum mechanics, justifications for the Born rule appeal to self-locating uncertainty or decision theory. Such justifications have focused exclusively on a pure-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a wave function. Recent works in quantum foundations suggest that it is viable to consider a mixed-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a (mixed-state) density matrix. Here, we develop the conceptual foundations for decoherence and branching in a mixed-state multiverse, and extend the standard Everettian justifications for the Born rule to this setting. This extended framework provides a unification of 'classical' and 'quantum' probabilities, and additional theoretical benefits, for the Everettian picture.Comment: 29 page

Degeneration and Entropy

Lakatos’s analysis of progress and degeneration in the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is well-known. Less known, however, are his thoughts on degeneration in Proofs and Refutations. I propose and motivate two new criteria for degeneration based on the discussion in Proofs and Refutations – superfluity and authoritarianism. I show how these criteria augment the account in Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, providing a generalized Lakatosian account of progress and degeneration. I then apply this generalized account to a key transition point in the history of entropy – the transition to an information-theoretic interpretation of entropy – by assessing Jaynes’s 1957 paper on information theory and statistical mechanics